Thursday, March 20, 2014

Decisions on rule 53.03 and when a claim can be filed.

2014-01-14 Moore v. Getahun, 2014 ONSC 237 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/g2lwp>

Whether it is appropriate for counsel to review experts’ draft reports

[47]           The defence called Dr. Ronald Taylor to testify as an expert. He filed a first report dated February 10, 2009 and a second report dated September 9, 2013. During his evidence, plaintiff’s counsel reviewed Dr. Taylor’s file and found notes about a one-and-a-half-hour telephone call that took place on September 6, 2013 between defence counsel and Dr. Taylor. During that phone conversation, defence counsel reviewed Dr. Taylor’s draft report dated August 27, 2013 and suggested changes for the final report. Dr. Taylor confirmed that he had sent his draft report “to Lerners for comments.” Dr. Taylor said he was happy with his draft report but Lerners made “suggestions” and he made “the corrections over the phone.”
[48]           The plaintiff submits that this phone meeting was improper. It was inappropriate for defence counsel to make suggestions to shape Dr. Taylor’s report.
[49]           Defence counsel’s written and oral submissions at the conclusion of the trial suggest that “experts are entitled to prepare draft reports and they are entitled to share those drafts with counsel for comment and discussion.”
[50]           For reasons that I will more fully outline, the purpose of Rule 53.03 is to ensure the expert witness’ independence and integrity. The expert’s primary duty is to assist the court. In light of this change in the role of the expert witness, I conclude that counsel’s prior practice of reviewing draft reports should stop. Discussions or meetings between counsel and an expert to review and shape a draft expert report are no longer acceptable.
[51]           If after submitting the final expert report, counsel believes that there is need for clarification or amplification, any input whatsoever from counsel should be in writing and should be disclosed to opposing counsel.
[52]           I do not accept the suggestion in the 2002 Nova Scotia decision, Flinn v. McFarland, 2002 NSSC 272 (CanLII), 2002 NSSC 272, 211 N.S.R. (2d) 201, that discussions with counsel of a draft report go to merely weight. The practice of discussing draft reports with counsel is improper and undermines both the purpose of Rule 53.03 as well as the expert’s credibility and neutrality.

Defence objections limiting the scope of the plaintiff’s expert evidence

[521]      Defence counsel took a restrictive view of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure objecting to all evidence not specifically covered in Dr. Richards’ report. I do not accept defence counsel’s approach as the proper or intended interpretation of Rule 53.03. Defence counsel limited the expert’s testimony to what is directly contained in his report, even if the substance of the testimony was latent in the report. However, in light of plaintiff counsel’s concession, Dr. Richards’ answers in chief were limited to the content of his reports. He was not permitted to comment on trial evidence, or any issues arising from the evidence, unless they were referred to in his reports.
[522]      I note that defence counsel did not follow the same set of strict rules when questioning her experts. I allowed the expanded questioning of the defence experts with respect to the evidence in this case, notwithstanding the defence counsel’s rigid approach limiting Dr. Richards’ evidence.
[523]      It would have been helpful to me as the trier of fact to have counsel present to each of the expert witnesses the agreed upon and the disputed facts, to fairly test whether the facts of the case impact upon their opinions contained in their expert reports. In light of the defence objections, this approach was not taken.
[524]      As well, defence counsel objected to the written reports being admitted for their truth into evidence. Copies of the reports were available to me as an aide to assist in following the evidence, but not admitted into evidence. The oral evidence was not necessarily as clear as the experts’ written reports. This made my task of fairly summarizing each expert’s evidence more challenging.
[525]      In light of the defence submissions, I have not considered the experts’ reports for their truth. However, I conclude that the common law rule, that an expert has the option of filing his report or testifying at the trial, does not make practical sense after the amendments to Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. I suggest that experts should be entitled to rely upon their written reports as part of their evidence-in-chief. This approach would both streamline the trial process and assist the trier of fact in understanding and assessing expert evidence. This is a matter for a higher court, or the Civil Rules Committee.

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2014-02-26 Huang v Mai, 2014 ONSC 1156 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/g50gr>
[36]           Given the statutory presumption that a limitation period begins to run from the date of the accident, the onus is on the plaintiff to persuade the court that the seriousness of his or her injury was not discoverable within the applicable limitation period and the plaintiff must also persuade the court that he or she acted with due diligence to discover if there was a cause of action: Yelda v. Vu2013 ONSC 4973 (CanLII), 2013 ONSC 4973 at paras. 29-30.
[37]           In Everding v. Skrijel2010 ONCA 437 (CanLII), 2010 ONCA 437, approving Vosin v. Hartin, [2000] O.T.C. 931 (S.C.J.), the Court of Appeal held that in applying the discoverability principle of the Limitation Act2002, the court should consider the threshold requirements of the Insurance Actand the Court held that a plaintiff will not have discovered his or her claim before the plaintiff knows that he or she has a substantial chance to succeed in recovering a judgment for damages. A person cannot be expected to commence an action before he or she knows that the necessary elements as set out in the legislation can be established on the evidence: Hoffman v. Jekel2011 ONSC 1324 (CanLII), 2011 ONSC 1324 at para. 9.
[38]           Under the case law, for the limitation period to begin to run, the plaintiff must have knowledge that his or her damages could be considered permanent and serious. I emphasize that the plaintiff must have knowledge because the limitation period does not begin simply because the plaintiff believes or ought to believe that he or she has a claim. Rather, the limitation period begins when the plaintiff first knew - which I take to be when he or she had an objective appreciation - that a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy.
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2014-02-24 Chapin v. Bennett, 2014 ONSC 1179 (CanLII)
 
Facts
[2]          A statement of the facts necessary for this motion is as follows:
1.   Patrick and Cathy Chapin were married December 23, 1987.  The Chapin’s had two children, Jessie born November 6, 1991 and Wesley born May 9, 1995. 
2.   On October 8, 2010 Cathy was a passenger in a motor vehicle being driven by her sister Gwen, and owned by Gwen’s husband Ronald, in Newmarket Ontario.  Gwen apparently ran through a red light and collided with a truck proceeding through the intersection on a green light.  As a result of Cathy’s injuries, Patrick got to her bedside just a few hours before her death the same day.
3.   As a result of Cathy’s death Patrick and Jessie commenced a Family Law Act action for damages for negligence and Patrick made a claim on behalf of Cathy’s estate as well.
4.   Patrick, who was already suffering from the death of his son Wesley, who had died on December 9, 2009, took the death of his wife very hard, and has been unable to return to work since that time.
5.   December 11, 2011 Patrick was examined by Dr. Suzanne Allain, a Psychiatrist.  The medical conclusion – set out in a report dated January 11, 2012, concluded that Patrick was suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  A further examination by Dr. Laurie Rezneck on August 15, 2013 confirmed this diagnosis in her report dated October 7, 2013.
6.   As a result of this diagnosis the plaintiffs have moved to amend their Statement of Claim to include a claim for damages for Patrick for PTSD and for past and future income loss, as well as for Jessie under the Family Law Act for damages resulting from the PTSD of her father Patrick.

Source:  http://www.fairassociation.ca/

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