Health information is generally regarded as among the most
sensitive of personal information. Even members of the Millennial
Generation, who regularly share details of their personal lives on
social media, are troubled by the thought of strangers accessing
the intimate details of their health histories.
There has been a string of data breaches in the health sector
recently, some breaches due to employee carelessness, some due to
intentional employee behaviour and some due to malicious
cyber-attacks. What recourse does an Ontario patient have when his
or her personal health information is unlawfully accessed or
distributed? The answer used to be clear that a patient whose
privacy rights were violated had no immediate access to the courts,
but the patient could make a complaint to the Information and
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (the "Privacy
Commissioner"). For the first time, a case now pending before
the Ontario Court of Appeal raises the question of whether a
patient-victim of a privacy breach can access the Ontario courts as
well as the mechanisms provided in Ontario's health sector
privacy legislation.
Ontario now recognizes a cause of action for breach of privacy.
In 2012, the Ontario Court of Appeal released its decision in
Jones v Tsige and explicitly recognized a common law tort
for breach of privacy in Ontario. Prior to that decision, there had
been no common law cause of action for invasion of privacy
recognized in Canadian law. Other provinces, such as Nova Scotia,
have left the door open to follow Ontario's lead.
1
In contrast, the courts of British Columbia have explicitly stated
that there is no common law tort of invasion of privacy in that
province.
2 This leaves citizens in British Columbia to
rely solely on statutory rights of action.
3
While it may seem like just an esoteric legal question whether
one's right of action is based on the common law or statute,
the answer to this question actually has very real, practical
implications for patients, health care providers and the insurers
of health care providers in Ontario.
This post provides an overview of privacy litigation in Ontario
and examines the important questions that are pending in Ontario
today with respect to privacy violations in the health care
sector.
The Tort of Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Traditionally in Ontario, there was no private cause of action
for breach of privacy. A person who alleged breach of privacy was
restricted to following the statutory procedures enacted in privacy
legislation.
The Ontario Court of Appeal changed the law of privacy in
Ontario in 2012 when it confirmed, in
Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32
(CanLII), that "intrusion upon seclusion" is a valid
cause of action in Ontario. In this case the plaintiff, a bank
employee, alleged that her privacy rights had been breached by
another bank employee. The issue before the Court of Appeal was
whether Ontario law recognized a right to bring a civil action for
damages for the invasion of personal privacy, or whether the
plaintiff's only remedy was to bring a complaint to the Office
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada under the
Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000,
c 5 ("PIPEDA").
In
Jones v Tsige, the Court of Appeal expanded the
common law and recognized the existence of a right of action for
privacy violations that involve "intrusion upon
seclusion". To establish intrusion upon seclusion, three key
elements must be satisfied:
1. The defendant's conduct must be intentional, which
includes acts of recklessness;
2. The defendant must have invaded, without lawful
justification, the plaintiff's private affairs or concerns;
and
3. A reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly
offensive causing distress, humiliation or anguish.
Notably, proof of actual loss flowing from the breach is not an
element of the cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion. This
is important because, generally, to sustain a law suit in Ontario,
a claimant needs to assert the breach of a recognized legal right
or obligation
and demonstrate that he or she has suffered
a quantifiable loss as a result of the breach. Not so for intrusion
upon seclusion. The Court of Appeal held that a victim of invasion
of privacy could collect monetary damages without having suffered a
quantifiable loss. Because damages will be for "moral"
harm, the Court of Appeal capped the amount of damages at $20,000,
but left open the possibility of awarding aggravated or punitive
damages in exceptional cases.
Ontario's recognition of the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion has made Ontario a key jurisdiction in which to launch
class actions for data breaches. For instance, if the personal
information of 50 people is improperly accessed, a class of those
50 people can launch a class action and possibly recover a million
dollars (not taking into account aggravated or punitive damages)
just by proving the invasion of privacy, with no requirement to
prove individual losses to class members. In fact, a class action
has already been certified in the banking context for inclusion
upon seclusion. In
Evans v The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2014
ONSC 2135 (CanLII) ("Evans"), an Ontario court
certified a class action lawsuit where a rogue bank employee
accessed personal banking information from 643 of the bank's
clients for fraudulent purposes.
In
Jones v Tsige, Jones did not sue the employer bank,
just the rogue employee. However, the plaintiff in
Evans
seeks to impose vicarious liability on the employer for invasion of
privacy by one of its employees. When the case goes to trial, at
issue will be whether the employer bank took adequate precautions
to protect clients' personal information from misuse by the
bank's employees. Specifically, the court will be called upon
to consider the standard of care which is owed by a bank to its
clients with respect to safeguarding personal information from
wrongful access by employees. This question gives rise to an
interesting privacy conundrum with which the court will have to
grapple: any obligation on an employer to protect personal
information by monitoring its employees is likely to quickly bump
up against an employer's corresponding obligation not to breach
the reasonable expectations of privacy of the employees
themselves.
Expanding the Tort of Intrusion Upon Seclusion to the Health
Care Sector
Recently, the media has reported a string of violations of
personal information held by health care facilities in Ontario. As
a result (as one would expect in the wake of
Jones v
Tsige), the health care facilities have come into the sights
of plaintiffs' class action lawyers.
In
Hopkins v Kay, 2014 ONSC 321
(CanLII), patients from the Peterborough Regional Health Centre
(the "Hospital") launched a $5.6 million class action
lawsuit against the Hospital alleging that approximately 280
patient records were intentionally and unlawfully accessed and
disseminated to third parties without the patients'
consent.
The Hospital, in response, brought a motion to strike the
plaintiffs' claim on the basis that it did not disclose a cause
of action. The Hospital argued that the claim was precluded by the
Personal Health Information Protection Act , 2004, SO
2004, c 3, Sch A ("PHIPA") because the legislature
intended PHIPA to be a comprehensive code that displaces any common
law cause of action, including intrusion upon seclusion.
Accordingly, the Hospital's contention is that the
plaintiffs' only recourse is to bring a complaint to the
Privacy Commissioner.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the Hospital's
motion to strike, concluding that it was not plain and obvious that
the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The Court's
decision is under appeal, with the Court of Appeal expected to hear
argument on December 15, 2014.
Ontario's Personal Health Information Protection
Act
PHIPA is Ontario's privacy legislation that sets out the
requirements that health information custodians must follow when
collecting, using and disclosing personal health information.
Part VI of PHIPA creates a comprehensive administrative scheme
for the enforcement of the Act. Where a person believes that
someone has breached a provision of PHIPA, the person may bring a
complaint to the Privacy Commissioner. PHIPA gives the Privacy
Commissioner discretion to determine whether or not to investigate
the complaint. Upon completing an investigation (if the Privacy
Commissioner chooses to investigate), the Privacy Commissioner may
issue an order directing the person(s) who contravened PHIPA to
take a variety of steps, including requiring a health information
custodian to cease or implement certain practices.
PHIPA also creates a statutory right of action. Under PHIPA, a
person may start a civil proceeding for damages for actual harm
that the person has suffered as a result of the contravention of
PHIPA, but only after the Privacy Commissioner has issued a final
order. PHIPA gives the court the jurisdiction to hear the claim and
make a damages award, limiting damages for mental anguish to
$10,000. The statutory right of action has three important elements
when compared to the test for the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion:
1. The complainant must have suffered "actual harm"
(whereas proof of harm is not required for the common law
tort);
2. The right of action only exists after the Privacy
Commissioner has issued a final order (whereas there is no such
prerequisite to starting an action for the common law tort);
and
3. Mental anguish damages are limited to $10,000 (whereas the
Ontario Court of Appeal contemplated damages up to $20,000 for
reasonable distress, humiliation or anguish).
When Does a Statutory Scheme Foreclose a Common Law Right of
Action?
The issue before the Court of Appeal in
Hopkins v Kay
will be whether PHIPA precludes a private right of action for the
tort of intrusion upon seclusion, that is, whether the complainant
must use the mechanism in PHIPA and only that
mechanism.
4
This case offers the Court of Appeal the opportunity to grapple
with the age-old question of how to balance the role of the
Legislature with the role of the judiciary. It is uncontested that
a role of the Legislature is to make laws, while a role of the
judiciary is to interpret legislation and enforce it. That said,
courts also have the jurisdiction to adapt the common law in a
manner consistent with the changing needs of society. The issue for
the Court of Appeal will be whether the legislative intention
underlying PHIPA is for PHIPA to provide the only remedies for data
breaches of personal health information, or whether extending the
scope of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to cover data
breaches of personal health information constitutes an appropriate
step in the development of the common law in Ontario.
PHIPA and Intrusion Upon Seclusion: Can They Co-Exist?
The Acting Commissioner, Brian Beamish, has said that the Office
of the Commissioner will appear as an intervenor before the Court
of Appeal and will argue that PHIPA does not prevent courts from
hearing cases related to personal health information
violations.
While it remains to be seen what the Court of Appeal will
decide, it seems that the enforcement scheme in PHIPA can exist
simultaneously with the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. When the
purpose and the provisions of PHIPA are examined as a whole, it
does not appear that the Legislature's intent was to displace
the common law, particularly when we consider the state of the
common law at the time of the enactment of the statute. PHIPA came
into effect on November 1, 2004 – eight years before the
Court of Appeal's decision in
Jones v Tsige. When the
legislation was originally enacted, there was no common law tort
for breach of privacy. Accordingly, the legislation did not take
away any rights otherwise existing at common law. Rather, the
legislation was additive in the sense that the Legislature gave
complainants a remedy where none existed at common law.
A statutory claim under PHIPA is quite different from a claim
that can be brought for intrusion upon seclusion. To recover
damages under PHIPA, a complainant must be able to prove that he or
she suffered actual harm. If the court determines that the breach
of PHIPA was willful or reckless, the court may include damages for
mental anguish, capped at $10,000.
In contrast, proof of harm is not an element of the common law
action for intrusion upon seclusion. The claimant only has to show
that: 1) the defendant's conduct was intentional; 2) the
defendant invaded, without lawful justification, the person's
private affairs or concerns; and 3) a reasonable person would
regard the invasion as highly offensive. If these three elements
can be established, the plaintiff is entitled to damages of up to
$20,000, and may be able to recover aggravated or punitive damages
in exceptional circumstances.
What Are the Ramifications of Expanding the Scope of Intrusion
upon Seclusion to the Health Care Sector?
The outcome of the pending appeal of the motion to strike the
common law claim in
Hopkins v Kay will set a legal
precedent for future data breaches involving personal health
information. There are currently at least two other cases involving
improperly accessed patient information that are waiting on the
Court of Appeal's decision. A $412 million class action lawsuit
has been launched against the Rouge Valley Health System after
parents alleged that their personal information was sold to a third
party by two hospital employees. Similarly, a data breach occurred
at the Sault Area Hospital when an employee inappropriately
accessed patients' medical records.
If the action is allowed to proceed to trial on the common law
tort, the outcome of
Hopkins v Kay may have sweeping
implications for the vicarious liability of employers for their
employees' actions. The issue of vicarious liability was not
dealt with by the court in
Jones v Tsige because the
plaintiff sued the employee directly, not the employer bank. In
Hopkins v Kay, the plaintiff class members have named both
the hospital and the employees as defendants. As mentioned above,
the issue of vicarious liability for privacy breaches committed by
employees is also at issue in
Evans. Whether one or both
of these cases proceed to trial, and in which order, remains to be
seen. Both of these cases ask the court to consider the steps an
employer should take to prevent an intentional or reckless privacy
violation.
How Employers Can Mitigate the Risk of a Data Breach by Their
Employees
Employers should ensure that employees are properly trained on
governing privacy legislation and internal data security policies,
and that such policies are enforced and continually reinforced.
However, it is uncertain whether policies and training will be
sufficient to protect an employer from vicarious liability in the
event that a data breach occurs. Organizations should use
encryption and other advanced technologies where possible. They
should have strict access controls, which only allow those in the
category of "need to know" to access sensitive records. A
data breach vulnerability audit can be commissioned to point out a
particular facility's vulnerabilities and recommend practices
and technology to address identified vulnerabilities.
Cyber-liability insurance may be one way to cover losses arising
from data breach. However, an insurance company will certainly
perform an audit before providing coverage to make sure the
employer is taking appropriate steps to reduce the chances of the
insurer having to pay out on the cyber-liability policy. As well,
reckless behaviour will no doubt have the insurer invoking an
exclusion in the cyber-liability policy to deny coverage.
Source: http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/342806/Civil+Law/Privacy+Law+Litigation+in+Ontario+From+the+Bank+to+the+Hospital+and+Beyond